Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation by Witmer, T. Richard
TRADE UNION LIABILITY: THE PROBLEM OF 
THE UNINCORPORATED CORPORATION 
T. RICHARD WITMERt 
A COMMERCIAL world that does most of its thinking in terms typified 
by the corporation and the partnership, the entity and the aggregate, 
the named and the nameless, the'state-created and the contractual, the 
limitedly liable and the unlimitedly liable, the perpetual and the tem- 
porary is likely to think strange the creatures that inhabit the non- 
commercial universe. For these non-commercial associations have at 
least some of the attributes of the corporation. In practice the trade 
unions, for instance, frequently make use of a common seal.' In fact 
they have as perpetual an existence and as perpetual a succession of 
interests as the corporation. Actually they own property even though 
to do so they may have to employ trustees.2 And it cannot be denied 
that they make by-laws "or private statutes for the better government 
of the corporation" which, in controversies between member and union, 
are enforced by the courts.3 Here, then, are four of the indicia of 
tGeneral Counsel's Office, Office of Price Administration. 
1. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Cramer, 60 Ill. App. 212, 217 (1895), 
(tffd, 164 111. 9, 45 N. E. 165 (1896) and in Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, 160 Ill. 282, 43 N. E. 
392 (1896), it was held that such use of a seal estopped the union from denying its 
corporate existence when it was sued as such. Contra: Local 1562, United Mine 
Workers v. Williams, 59 Can. Sup. Ct. 240, 49 D. L. R. 578 (1919). 
2. LLOYD, THE LAW RELATING TO UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS (1938) 165 ff.; 
WRIGHfTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1923) 336 ff. 
3. The cases are few in which a union has sued to enforce its rules against its 
members. See, however, National Sailors' and Firemen's Union v. Reed, [1926] Ch. 
536, 537 ("injunction to restrain the defendants, as branch secretaries or officials of the 
Union or in the name of the Union, calling members of the plaintiff Union out oln 
strike . . . without the authority of the executive council of the Union"); Western- 
United Dairy Co. v. Nash, 293 Ill. App. 162, 12 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937) (joint suit by 
former employer and union to enjoin member from soliciting employer's customers 
contrary to collective agreement and the union's by-laws). Cf. Thomas v. International 
Seamen's Union, 101 S. W. (2d) 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (injunction, inter alia, 
against use of International's name in an unauthorized local strike by members who, 
though in good standing, were "in rebellion against their union"). On the collection 
of dues and fines by suit, see Comment, Trade Unions-Rights and Obligations Arising out 
of Membership (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 291, 295. More frequently the union 
resorts to self-help in the shape of expulsion for violation of a by-law and the question 
arises in a suit for reinstatement or for insurance benefits lost by the expulsion. See, e.g., 
Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 52, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 286 Fed. 
949 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd. 298 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924), rev'd and bill dismissed 
for want of federal jurisdiction, 270 U. S. 629 (1926); Flynn v. Brotherhood of R. R. 
Trainmen, 111 Kan. 415, 207 Pac. 829 (1922); Wolstenholme v. Amalgamated Musicians' 
Union, [1926] 2 Ch. 388. See also Conniff v. Jamour, 31 Misc. 729, 65 N. Y. Supp. 
40 
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corporateness which have come down to us from Blackstone's time' or 
before. Yet these associations lack that first indicium of corporateness, 
a charter. They cannot, in most jurisdictions, be sued in their own 
names. And no court has yet suggested that theirs is a limited liability.5 
True, nearly twenty years ago the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in deciding the case of Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers 
of America,6 tried to supply one of these lacks. Following the lead of 
the House of Lords in the Taff Vale case,' the Court there held for the 
first time that a trade union could be sued in its own name. To many 
this seemed appropriate enough. Organizations that were as real and 
as important as trade unions ought to be made responsible. Constantly 
they were insuring their members and it was inevitable that claims 
arising out of these contracts should be the subject of controversy.8 
317 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (constitutional provision denying accident benefits to members 
injured while working for less than union wages); O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Ass'n 
of Plumbers, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938). 
4. 1 BL. COMM. *475. 
5. Limited liability, of course, was not one of Blackstone's criteria of corporate- 
ness. Nor even today is it generally to be found playing that role in the legal literature. 
At least one American jurisdiction, Massachusetts, in the early stages of the develop- 
ment of the business corporation made the stockholders unlimitedly liable. But it was 
soon recognized, as it is today in the business literature, that as a practical matter 
the large group and unlimited liability are incompatible. See, e.g., Anonymous, Manu- 
facturing Corporations (1829) 2 AMERICAN JURIST 92. In Pennsylvania, unlike Massa- 
chusetts, it seems to have been taken for granted by the legislature that limited liability 
was a sine qua non of corporateness. The granting of this privilege was one of the 
recurrent obj ections of the governors in their veto messages to the legislature. See, 
e.g., Governor Shunk's message of March 9, 1846, vetoing "An Act to Incorporate the 
Managers and Company of the Conestoga Steam Mills", 7 PA. ARCHIVES (4th ser. 
1902) 83; Governor Bigler's message of March 29, 1852 vetoing "An Act to Incorporate 
the Charlestown Silver Lead Mining Company", ibid. at 554. 
6. 259 U. S. 344 (1922). 
7. Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C. 426. 
8. There is a noticeable tendency to allow a union to be sued in its own name 
when the suit is for insurance benefits even though such a suit could not be maintained 
under other circumstances: with Fitzpatrick v. International Typographical Union, 149 
Minn. 401, 184 N. W. 17 (1921) (refusal to admit to printers' home) compare St. Paul 
Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725 
(1905) (breach of collective bargain); with Clark v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 
328 Mo. 1084, 43 S. W. (2d) 404 (1931) (life insurance) compare Ruggles v. Inter- 
national Ass'n of Iron Workers, 331 Mo. 20, 52 S. W. (2d) 860 (1932) (wrongful 
expulsion); with Winchester v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 203 N. C. 735, 167 
S. E. 49 (1932) (total disability beneficial certificate) compare Hallman v. Wood, 
Wire & Metal Lathers' International Union, 15 S. E. (2d) 361 (N. C. 1941) (black- 
listing). But cf. Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 670, 147 So. 479, 480 (1933) 
(Our statute "unquestionably permits] suits on benefit certificates issued by these 
associations. . . . But to stop there would not be sufficient protection for them, for 
the integrity of their benefit certificates can only be maintained when the courts are 
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Continually they were disciplining their members; here again was a 
source of litigation. Time and again they were indulging, rightly or 
wrongly, in concerted activities - strikes, picketing, boycotts, and in- 
ducing breach of contract -against their employers; if the substantive 
law governing the use of these weapons was too harsh it should be cor- 
rected with an appropriate finesse instead of being left to the hit or 
miss method of a back-handed defense. So ran the argument. And 
today there would be added to this list of most frequent sources of 
trade union litigation, this time chiefly from the union side, the collec- 
tive bargain. 
But the Coronado case has not won favor with the State courts. In 
spite of the common name by which the union calls itself, the common 
treasury out of which it finances its activities, the common officers by 
which it is governed -all of them at war with the common law notion 
that equates an unincorporated association to a mere aggregate of men 
-it has been rejected in case after case that has been decided since 
1922.9 The controversy within the Harvard faculty between Professor 
Warren10 (who argued for a construction of the holding based solely 
on the terms of the Sherman Act under which the suit in the Coronado 
case was brought) and Professor Dodd" (who foresaw a much wider 
meaning for it) has, for the most part, been won by the narrow-con- 
struction proponent. In the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it 
has been restricted to federal causes of action.12 
open to them for the preservation of many other of their rights and duties ancillary 
to the issuance of such certificates"; so in suit by Varnado to garnish debt owing 
Whitney by Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, the claim against Whitney being for 
libel). 
9. District No. 21, United Mine Workers v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S. W. 
546 (1925); Walker v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S. E. 
146 (1938); Cahill v. Plumbers, Gas & Steam Fitters' and Helpers' Local 93, 238 Ill. 
App. 123 (1925); Tyler v. Boot & Shoe Workers Union, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N. E. 509 
(1933); Grant v. Carpenters' District Council, 322 Pa. 62, 185 Atl. 273 (1936); West 
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 103 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927). See also cases 
cited supra note 8. Cf. Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 753 
(no capacity to sue). Cf. Unkovich v. New York Central R. R., 114 N. J. Eq. 448, 
450, 168 Atl. 867, 868 (Ch. 1933), aff'd, 117 N. J. Eq. 20, 174 Atl. 876 (1934) ("There 
is no statute that I am aware of which provides that an unincorporated trade union 
. . . cannot be sued in this court in its established name" and our practice has been 
to the contrary; it is therefore immaterial whether the statutes do or do not cover 
equitable causes). 
10. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION, 648 ff. (1929). 
11. Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations (1929) 42 HARv. L. 
REv. 977, 1001 ff. 
12. Rule 17(b): " . . . a partnership or other incorporated association . . . 
may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against 
it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States." 
The rule also allows such a suit to be maintained when it would be maintainable in 
the courts of the state in which the district court is held. 
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Whether this rejection is to be counted significant or not, whether it 
means a continued refusal to recognize the entity or nothing more than 
a reluctance to adopt a new procedural device,'3 can be determined only 
by looking at the alternative methods of suit. For the lack of a name 
for purposes of suing and being sued is no very great matter if other 
devices are available to accomplish the same end. In most states there 
are such devices. The most important of them is the class suit. It speaks, 
in its usual formulation, the language of individuals; it accomplishes, 
when it is used properly, all that could be hoped for from a Coronado 
case doctrine. On it have been modeled or out of it have developed 
many of the more specialized methods which are set up in the statutes 
of various of the states.'4 The problems which these statutes raise as 
well as those they seek to solve can best be understood against the back- 
ground it furnishes. It is to the class suit, then, that chief attention will 
be given here. 
Two principal questions face the litigant who attempts to use the class 
suit device in an action for damages: (1) whether it is available as a 
means of reaching the common funds of the union and (2) whether 
it can be used to hold the members of the union liable individually. The 
first of these found an answer in Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers.l5 Here the widow of a union member, suing to recover on 
an insurance policy issued by the defendant, was unfortunate enough 
to have her claim stated in assumpsit. The court, not content with 
explaining that assumpsit would not lie against an unincorporated asso- 
ciation, went on to say "that a plain remedy remains in equity, where 
suit may be brought against some of the members as representing them- 
13. In both the Coronado and the Taff Vale cases there are expressions to the 
effect that the question there before the courts was one of form. See, e.g., Taft, C. J. 
in the former at p. 390: "Though such a conclusion as to the suability of trade unions 
is of primary importance in the working out of justice and in protecting individuals 
and society from possibility of oppression and injury in their lawful rights . . . 
it is after all in essence and principle merely a procedural matter"; and Lord Lindley 
in the latter at p. 445: "The use of the name in legal proceedings imposes no duties 
and alters no rights: it is only a more convenient mode of proceeding than that which 
would have to be adopted if the name could not be used." But cf. Lord Brampton at 
p. 442: ". . . I do not see how it would be possible for these [common] funds to be 
made applicable for remuneration or recompense or redress for any wrongful act done 
by a body of men like the society unless the society could be sued in the way in which 
it is proposed to sue them, and as I think it may be." Cf. Operative Plasterers' Inter- 
national Ass'n v. Case, 93 F. (2d) 56 (App. D. C. 1937) (the question as one of 
"substance" or "procedure" under full faith and credit clause). 
14. Collected citations to these statutes will be found in Cole, The Civil Suability, 
at Law, of Labor Unions (1939) 8 FORDHAM L. REv. 29, 33 n.; 2 TELLER, THE LAW 
GOVERNING LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) 1369; WARREN, op. cit. 
supra note 10, at 547 ff. 
15. 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:57:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
44 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51: 40 
selves and all others who have the same interest" and "that in the equity 
proceeding, after decree, the chancellor can be moved to compel the 
defendants to see that the treasury of the association pays the claim."'16 
If this case stood by itself, one could not feel any very great assur- 
ance about the inferences to be drawn from it. The suggestion of the 
court as to the equitable remedy could be said to be nothing more than 
dictum. But it cannot be dismissed so summarily as this. It is reinforced 
too strongly by other authority. The suggestion of the English courts 
(before the Trade Union Act of 1906 completely immunized union funds 
from tort liability)'7 that the trustees of the union's funds be joined 
as parties defendant" looks in the same direction. The rationale of the 
Canadian cases requiring that the plaintiff in a class action allege and 
prove that there is a common fund ("trust-fund" is the court's wording 
of the matter) from which any judgment that is entered will be satis- 
fied'9 reinforces it. And it is in accord with those cases in which, in 
fact, judgments against union funds have been secured by class actions.20 
16. Id. at 421, 114 Ati. at 377. Accord: Gottselig v. Cigarmakers International 
Union, 76 Pa. Super. 273 (1920). Under Rule 2153 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 332 Pa. cviii (1939), the practice has been somewhat modified and a 
suit may now be brought against an association in its own name or against an officer 
of the association as trustee ad litem. In either case, judgment against the association 
will support execution against its property (Rule 2158) but will not render the individual 
members liable (Rule 2155) unless they have been joined as parties defendant (Rule 
2153 (c) ). 
17. 6 Enw. 7, c. 47, ? 4, 19 HIALSBURY'S STAT. 687 (1906). 
18. Ideal Films v. Richards, [1927] 1 K. B. 374 (C. A.). See Taff Vale Ry. v. 
Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C. 426, 443 (per Lord Lindley) "I 
have . . . no doubt whatever that . . . some of its [the trade union's] members 
could be sued on behalf of themselves and the other members of the society. 
Further, it is in my opinion equally plain that if the trustees in whom the property 
of the society is legally vested were added as parties, an order could be made in the 
same action for the payment by them out of the funds of the society of all damages 
and costs for which the plaintiff might obtain judgment against the trade union." 
Cf. Linaker v. Pilcher, 70 L. J. K. B. 396, 401 (1901) (suit for libel against defendant- 
trustees of a trade union not, however, in a representative capacity: "There will 
. . . be judgment . . . for 1,000? damages and costs against the defendants the 
trustees . . . and a declaration that they are entitled to be indemnified out of the 
funds of the society.") 
19. Robinson v. Adams, 56 Ont. L. R. 217, [1925] 1 D. L. R. 359 (App. Div. 1924); 
Barrett v. Harris, 51 Ont. L. R. 484, 491, 69 D. L. R. 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (non- 
trade union case; good summary of English and Canadian holdings). 
20. Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, 160 Ill. 282, 43 N. E. 392 (1896) (creditor's bill based 
on prior judgment in assumpsit); Bayci v. Rango, 304 Ill. App. 203, 25 N. E. (2d) 
1015 (1940); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N. E. 335 (1932) (suit for death 
benefits on statutory class action provision); Nissen v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N. W. 858 (1941) (mandamus for reinstatement in 
union plus damages); St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, No. 9, 
97 Wash. 282, 294, 166 Pac. 665, 669 (1917) ("In the decree, the costs were awarded 
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Such a judgment, it may be admitted, runs contrary to the frequent 
refusal of the courts to talk of the union as an entity. It is, however, 
a counterpart of group liability in other respects. The employer who seeks 
to enforce the arbitration provisions of a collective agreement, the mem- 
bers who contest the union's interpretation of its seniority rules,21 the 
former associate who claims to have been wrongfully expelled and asks 
for reinstatement,22 are all concerned with group responsibility in as real 
a sense as is he whose claim is for payment out of the common treasury. 
In none of these other cases is there any question as to the amenability 
of the group to suit as a group or as to the possibility of "recovery" 
against certain of the respondents, but not against the unions . . ."; held: this was 
wrong); Metallic Roofing Co. v. Jose, 12 Ont. L. R. 200, C. R. [1909] A. C. 30 (C. P. 
1905 & Div. Ct. 1906), appeal dismissed, 14 Ont. L. R. 156, C. R. [1909] A. C. 37 (C. A. 
1907), revd on other grounds, [1908] A. C. 514, C. R. [1909] A. C. 44 (P. C. 1908); 
Cotter v. Osborne, 18 Manitoba 471, 482, C. R. [1911] 1 A. C. 137, 147 (C. A. 1909) 
(suit for injunction and damages for tortious interference with plaintiff's business: 
"There will be judgment . . . for $2,000 and costs . . . against those defendants 
who are representatives as representing all persons who . . . constituted . . . The 
Journeymen Plumbers . . . Local Union, No. 62, and declaring that the property and 
assets of the said association . . . are liable to satisfy the claim of the plaintiffs 
against the said representative defendants for damages and costs.") See also the 
judgment of the trial court in Furniture Workers' Union, Local 1007 v. United Brother- 
hood of Carpenters, 108 P. (2d) 651, 655 (Wash. 1940) : "Upon their first cause of 
action, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment . . . in the sum of $3,954.42 . . . together 
with their costs and disbursements . . . against all of the members of Local 2097, 
so far only as it may be enforced against the property of Local 2097, which is the 
joint property of all of the members of Local 2097." Accord: Pearson v. Andesburg, 
28 Utah 495, 80 Pac. 307 (1905) (non-trade union case). See Newark International 
Baseball Club v. Theatrical Managers, Agents & Treasurers Union, 125 N. J. Eq. 575, 
577, 7 A. (2d) 170, 172 (Ch. 1939) ("In many jurisdictions in the absence of statute, 
it is held that a suit does not lie against a union by name, but that in equity a number 
of members may be made parties defendant as representatives of the union.... The 
same result accrues from this method of procedure and from a suit against the union 
by name. An injunction binds all officers and members of the union . . . and if costs 
be adjudged against the defendants, it seems the common property of the members is 
liable.") Contra: District No. 21, United Mine Workers v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 
277 S. W. 546 (1925) (writ of prohibition granted against lower court's entertaining 
a bill "brought in equity by certain coal operators to recover unliquidated damages for 
personal injuries to their servants and . . . their property" and asking that a receiver 
for the union-defendants' funds be appointed). 
21. On the use of the class suit in this type of case, see Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 407, 31 P. (2d) 971, 982 (1934). On necessary 
parties in such a suit, see Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S. W. (2d) 
239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Gordon v. Hawkins, 66 S. W. (2d) 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1933); McMurray v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 54 F. (2d) 923 (C.C.A. 3d, 
1931). 
22. On the use of the class suit in this type of case, see Biller v. Egan, 290 Ill. 
App. 219, 8 N. E. (2d) 205 (1937). 
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from it as an "it." Yet, presumably the belief that the non-entity doctrine 
immunizes association funds from effective suit23 inspired many of 
the statutes which are now on the books; one of their most common 
clauses is that giving a successful plaintiff recourse against collective funds 
of the group. Nevertheless, as the discussion above indicates, no such 
special statute is called for. With no more than the class action device 
to accomplish the job, the non-entity has been turned into a fully respon- 
sible corporate group. If we choose to think of the result as a procedural 
remolding of our concept of group liability, our so thinking is a reminder 
that in modern law, as Maine taught us was the case in ancient, substance 
is "gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."24 
That not all jurisdictions are agreed on this is, of course, to be ex- 
pected. In New York, for instance, the General Associations Law has 
made for a good deal of confusion. Section 13 of the Law, which at 
first glance would appear to be little more than a class action provision 
with a statutorily-named representative,25 is not unambiguous in its 
wording: 
"An action . . . may be maintained, against the president or 
treasurer of . . . an [unincorporated] association . . . upon any 
cause of action, for or upon which the plaintiff may maintain such 
an action . . . against all the associates, by reason of their 
liability therefore, either jointly or severally." 26 
But with the help of Section 15 which provides that where, in such an 
action, judgment is given for money it must first be satisfied "out of 
any personal or real property belonging to the association, or owned, 
jointly or in common, by all the members thereof" it ought not to be 
difficult to resolve the ambiguity of the earlier section in favor of group 
liability. Particularly would this be so when it appears that under Sec- 
tion 12- a section analogous to 13 but dealing with the association as 
a party plaintiff instead - suit may be maintained for libel to the group 
without any showing that each member was so injured personally that 
he could maintain a similar suit in his own right.27 The difficulty is 
23. For an earlier case apparently so holding, see Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron 
Molders' Union, No. 125, 150 Fed. 155, 183 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1906), aff'd, 166 Fed. 45 
(C.C.A. 7th, 1908). 
24. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ONEARLY LAW AND CUSTOM (1891) 389. 
25. So characterized in Society Brand Clothes v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 
[1931] Can. Sup. Ct. 321, 324, [1931] 3 D.LR. 361, 363 (1930). 
26. N. Y. GEN. Ass. LAWS ? 13. 
27. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, 261 App. Div. 181, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 
860 (1st Dep't 1941), motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals granted, 261 App. 
Div. 897, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 315 (1st Dep't 1941); Bradley v. Conners, 169 Misc. 442, 
7 N. Y. S. (2d) 294 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Gardner v. Jonas, 97 N. Y. L. J. 1558 (Sup. Ct. 
1937). Cf. Stone v. Textile Examiners & Shrinkers Employers' Ass'n, 137 App. Div. 
655, 122 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1910). 
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that Sections 13 and 15 do not stand alone. Section 16, with its pro- 
vision that upon return of an execution against the association wholly 
or partially unsatisfied an additional action may be brought against the 
individual members with recovery of the costs of the principal suit 
as part of the damages,28 must also be reckoned with. 
Probably it is this last section that explains the reluctance with which 
the New York judges have accepted suits for damages29 under the Act. 
Their repeated insistence that it be alleged that the active participants 
in a transaction had authority to act for all of the members of the 
union30 and their insistence that it be shown that this authority ex- 
tended to binding the personal credit of all these members, even though, 
in the particular case, it would seem that suit was brought only to 
recover from the union treasury,31 can hardly otherwise be accounted 
for in rational terms. A result of this sort may be deplored, but it 
serves as a warning that what we may call the procedural question 
(How can a suit be maintained?) cannot be dissociated from what we 
may call the liability question (Who is liable and for how much?) or 
from what we may call the agency question (For whose acts are the 
group or its members liable?). The three questions are so bound 
28. This does not mean, however, that in the subsequent suit the judgment against 
the union is res judicata as to all matters determined there. See infra p. 57. The 
discussion here is concerned only with ? 16 as a device for interpreting ? 13. 
29. Apart from the expulsion cases, most of the citations below are to contract 
actions. The same rule has been applied in tort as well. See Mazurajtis v. Maknawyce, 
93 Misc. 337, 157 N. Y. Supp. 151 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Tannenbaum v. Hofbauer, 142 Misc. 
120, 253 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1931). 
30. See Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N. Y. 225, 232, 109 N. E. 244, 246 (1915); 
People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 218 N. Y. 115, 123, 112 N. E. 752, 
754 (1916); Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 481, 224 N. Y. Supp. 193, 200 (3d 
Dep't 1927), aff'd, 250 N. Y. 617, 166 N. E. 346 (1929). But cf. Polin v. Kaplan, 
257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931). The remarks in these cases, all of which are 
suits for damages caused by an allegedly wrongful expulsion from a trade union, might 
be dismissed as dictum in view of the court's reiterated holding that there is no liability 
for a mistaken judgment on the part of the union officials in the absence of bad faith. 
But that they cannot be taken to mean no more than this is indicated by holdings clearly 
to the effect stated in the text in such non-trade union cases as McCabe v. Goodfellow, 
133 N. Y. 89, 30 N. E. 728 (1892), the leading case on the subject, and the many others 
which have followed it including, among others, as of special interest, Lightbourn v. 
Walsh, 97 App. Div. 187, 89 N. Y. Supp. 856 (2d Dep't 1904); Siff v. Forbes, 135 
App. Div. 39, 119 N. Y. Supp. 773 (1st Dep't 1909). 
31. Davis v. Young, 123 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (suit to enforce 
payment of certificates of indebtedness issued in lieu of strike benefits); Whitney v. 
King, 210 App. Div. 312, 314, 206 N. Y. Supp. 194, 196 (3d Dep't 1924) (concurring 
opinion in suit to recover on beneficial certificates). Cf. Strauss v. Thoman, 60 Misc. 
72, 111 N. Y. Supp. 745 (Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'd, 129 App. Div. 905, 113 N. Y. Supp. 
1148 (1st Dep't 1908); Meinhart v. Contresta, 194 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1922) 
(refusing to vacate attachment of union property in suit by business agent for salary 
past due). 
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together in any problem that comes before a court that no one of them 
can be understood without reference to the other two. They are so 
intertwined that no solution worked out by a court in a particular case 
can be appreciated or appraised without weighing its repercussions on 
all three. Thus, given unlimited liability such as the New York statute 
presupposes one cannot expect to find tolerance of procedural devices 
that would be usable where the liability is limited. Given unlimited 
liability one can also expect to see the field of the agent's authority 
considerably narrowed from what it would otherwise be. In contrast, 
the effect of a procedural device that reaches only the common funds, 
which ensures limited liability, can be expected to be a broadening of 
the scope of the officer's power to bind those funds - an effect that is 
amply illustrated by the expansion of his power in the case of the cor- 
poration during the nineteenth century. 
Unfortunately there is little in the reports, apart from the New York 
cases just discussed, against which our conclusion as to the "agency" 
aspect of the problem can be checked with any satisfaction. Three of 
the fields of labor litigation are almost totally barren, a fourth is in 
hopeless confusion. The routinized transaction of issuing an insurance 
policy or a beneficial certificate, for instance, has yielded little on the 
subject, in spite of the scores of cases in which suits have been brought 
on such policies. The question of authority to make a collective bargain 
has hardly been mooted.32 And the problems arising from expulsion 
from the union have not been of this kind. Authority in this last 
matter is defined in fairly explicit terms by constitution and by-law; 
the "say", to use Llewellyn's term,33 is well differentiated from the 
not-say. Perhaps it is significant that it is in these same fields where 
the authority of the immediate actors has been least questioned that 
the fullest measure of corporate responsibility has been achieved, so full 
a measure in fact that it is almost beyond question. 
In contrast with these situations is the industrial dispute broadly and, 
more narrowly, the picket line. Here is membership participation in 
an almost wholly unroutinized affair. Here, even if the "say" is fixed 
in by-law and resolution, its restraining power is not ubiquitous. No 
matter how hard the organization may try to maintain discipline, no 
matter how often its officers may exhort the members to be peaceable, 
32. But compare Fell v. Berry, 124 App. Div. 336, 108 N. Y. Supp. 669 (1st Dep't 
1908); A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909). For dis- 
cussions of authority in other sorts of contract cases, see United Order of American 
Brick Layers v. Fitzgerald, 59 Ill. App. 362 (1895) ; Meyers v. Longshoremen's Pro- 
tective Union, 1 La. App. 767 (1925) ; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser, 
174 Va. 229, 6 S. E. (2d) 562 (1940). 
33. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of 
Juristic Method (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1355, 1383. 
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there will be occasions when the more unruly will get out of hand. It 
is these occasions that have bred litigation. The results in the reports 
are as confusing as the occasions. If some courts have gone so far as 
to hold that the union which calls a strike must take the responsibility 
for all that the strikers thereafter do" (an attitude which dates from 
a time when strikes and strikers were alike unrespectable), if others, 
only a little more lenient, have held that a union which does not dis- 
avow its members' acts by expelling them is responsible for what they 
do"5 (an attitude which is only too likely to result in a union-breaking 
campaign), and if still others have looked upon the union's continued 
payment of strike benefits or its furnishing of counsel to defend its 
members as evidence of approval and, therefore, of "ratification,"36 these 
can be readily matched with other cases in which the courts have passed 
over such points sub silentio and rejected a claim of union liability in 
the absence of such facts as would be needed to pass muster in a non-trade 
union vicarious liability case.37 This last, it would seem, is the law that 
34. Franklin Union, No. 4 v. The People, 220 Ill. 355, 379, 77 N. E. 176, 184 
(1906) (contempt proceeding; two judges dissent); Connett v. United Hatters, 76 N. J. 
Eq. 202, 74 Atl. 188 (Ch. 1909). See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 
255 U. S. 344, 403 (1922). 
35. Alaska Steamship Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 236 Fed. 964, 
972 (W. D. Wash. 1916); Great Northern Ry. v. Great Falls Lodge, International 
Ass'n of Machinists, 283 Fed. 557, 560 (D. Mont. 1922); United Traction Co. v. 
Droogan, 115 Misc. 672, 189 N. Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1921). 
36. Jones v. Maher, 62 Misc. 388, 395, 116 N. Y. Supp. 180, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1909), 
aff'd, 141 App. Div. 919, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1126 (2d Dep't 1910) ("I think . . . that 
those lodges, in thus regularly sustaining the picketing by pecuniary support for so 
long a time, must be held to have so acted with knowledge, actual or constructive, of 
the unlawful conduct of the picketing, and, therefore, that they must be held to have 
aided and abetted such unlawful conduct"; contra for sporadic "acts of actual sub- 
stantial violence"). See Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, No. 753, 
371 Ill. 377, 390, 21 N. E. (2d) 308, 315 (1939), affd, 312 U. S. 287 (1941). 
37. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, No. 131, 
165 Ind. 421, 430, 75 N. E. 877, 880 (1905) ("That fourteen of the six hundred members 
of the union did disregard the express instructions and declared policy of the union to 
conduct the strike peacefully, and of their own initiative indulged in acts of disorder 
. . . is not of itself sufficient to condemn the union as a body. The strike being 
properly conceived and conducted by the great majority of members, its purpose will 
not be defeated by the unlawful conduct of a few rowdies and lawbreakers . . ."); 
Thomas Russell & Sons v. Stampers & Gold Leaf Local Union, No. 22, 57 Misc. 96, 102, 
107 N. Y. Supp. 303, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1907) ("No authority holding that the unlawful 
acts of one or more members of a voluntary association ipso facto bind the association 
has been brought to my attention. Conclusive proof should appear upon which to base 
the charge that the defendant associations, as such, promoted or ratified the acts com- 
plained of. .- . . Until a labor union . . . shall be shown presumptively to have acted 
unlawfully it is entitled to be regarded as a law abiding body . ."); Segenfeld v. 
Friedman, 117 Misc. 731, 732, 193 N. Y. Supp. 128, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ("The 
defendant union cannot be enjoined pendente lite for no proof is presented to establish 
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is now established by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act38 and its 
state counterparts. It is clearly the rule applied in most instances in 
which the actor is an officer, rather than a member, of the union.39 
The problem of a union's responsibility for its members' acts is, 
moreover, one that has been largely tested in equity. And equity has 
known the use of the grandiose flourish in labor controversies, has often 
not molded its decrees as neatly as it might and as, in other situations, 
it professes to. Many of the cases in which a broad responsibility doc- 
trine has been preached are, if we may believe the courts' stories of 
what happened, what we may call "big situation" cases - cases arising 
out of tumultuous occasions in which assaults, batteries, rioting and 
bloodshed were common. They are cases in which the court has sat 
as an ad hoc legislature, in which there has been no more attempt at 
careful inquiry into agency or liability, as these terms are understood 
at law, than there would have to be in the legislature itself. They do 
not, in their handling or in their outcome, resemble judicial decisions 
that it either authorized or ratified the acts complained of."); Aluminum Castings Co. 
v. International Molders' Union, Local 84, 197 Fed. 221, 223 (W. D. N. Y. 1912) 
(though it appears that there have been assaults and other intimidating acts by mem- 
bers of the union "there is nothing to show that Local No. 84 or its principal officers 
have incited or coerced members of the union or other strikers" to commit them). 
38. 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. ? 106 (1934): "No officer or member of any 
association or organization, and no association or organization participating or inter- 
ested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable . . . for the unlawful acts 
of individuals, officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual par- 
ticipation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of acts after actual 
knowledge thereof." 
39. Cases imposing liability: Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' District 
Council, 226 Ill. App. 532 (1922), aff'd, 308 Ill. 488, 139 N. E. 867 (1923); Clarkson 
v. Laiblan, 178 Mo. App. 708, 161 S. W. 660 (1913) (injunction), 202 Mo. App. 682, 
216 S. W. 1029 (1919) (damages); Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants, 
[1901] A. C. 426; Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, [19031 2 K. B. 
600 (C. A.). Cases denying liability: Tannenbaum v. Hofbauer, 142 Misc. 120, 121, 
253 N. Y. Supp. 90, 91 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ("The plaintiff's evidence establishes for the 
purposes of this motion: (1) That the unlawful injury [assault and battery] to the 
plaintiff was effected by an agent of the defendant union in furtherance of a strike 
called by the defendant union; (2) that no by-law, resolution or official decree authorized 
this tortious act; and (3) that the unlawful activity of Powers and of other business 
agents were not continued over a long enough period or otherwise notorious enough 
to warrant an inference that the members of the defendant union knew of these illegal- 
ities and acquiesced in them"; hence, motion to set aside dismissal of complaint denied); 
Rockwood Corp. v. Bricklayers' Local Union, No. 1, 33 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 8th, 
1929); United States v. International Fur Workers Union, 100 F. (2d) 541, 547 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938) cert. denied, 306 U. S. 653 (1939) ("All that the [trial] court 
said . . . was that if the individual defendants did the things charged against the 
unions 'upon behalf of the unions', they might be found guilty along with the indi- 
viduals. . . . It was erroneous; it excluded the issue whether the union had authorized 
or ratified what their officers did upon their behalf.") 
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at all. Often the premise, spoken or unspoken, has been that an in- 
junction against wrongdoing does no harm to the peaceable.40 In this 
light the requirement that "agency" be shown is hardly more than a 
requirement that numerous harmful acts have been done. But whether 
we think these cases rightly or wrongly decided, whether or not we 
believe that it would have been better for the courts not to have acted 
at all, whether we applaud or despair of similar instances in which they 
have not acted, there is little ground for believing that the doctrine taught 
and applied by those courts which have acted will be carried over to the 
"little situation," much less that it will be carried over to a suit for 
damages. Here that "fundamental difficulty" of which Middleton, J., 
spoke,41 the difficulty which arises "where the thing that is complained 
of cannot be brought home to any individual," is far more important 
and much less easily overcome than when the suit is for an injunction. 
It may be worth suggesting, further, that this is a problem in which 
corporate responsibility and individual liability frequently merge. Picket- 
ing, to take an example, cannot be stopped unless pickets are stopped. 
In those instances in which the injunction against picketing is granted 
because the object of the collective action is improper,42 such a binding 
40. For examples of such a view, see United Traction Co. v. Droogan, 115 Misc. 
672, 189 N. Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Cumberland Coal & Ry. v. McDougall, 44 
Nova Scotia 535, 9 E.L.R. 204 (1910). See also the cases cited infra note 67. For 
a criticism of such an attitude, see Union Pac. R. R. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 116 (C. C. D. 
Neb. 1902); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1906). 
41. Robinson v. Adams, 56 Ont. L. R. 217, 224, [1925] 1 D. L. R. 359, 364 (App. 
Div. 1924) ("The fundamental difficulty of suing a mob or any unorganized body 
cannot be avoided. Any individual guilty of a tortious act can be made answerable 
in damages, and in many circumstances an injunction may be awarded against him, 
but where the thing that is complained of cannot be brought home to any individual, 
it is hard to see how the person injured can successfully invoke the aid of a Court 
of justice." ) 
42. Now, however, that picketing has been granted protection under- the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the propriety or impropriety of the object of the picketing will undoubtedly 
have much less determinative force than it formerly had. Already the Supreme Court 
has reversed one state court which had enjoined picketing carried on by a union none 
of whose members was employed by the plaintiff in order to induce him to "unionize" 
his shop [American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941)]; another 
which had enjoined picketing an employer who, at the expiration of a collective con- 
tract, had discharged the defendant's only member hired by him and had entered into 
a closed shop contract with a rival union [Journeymen Tailors Union, Local 195, 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Miller's, 312 U. S. 658 (1941)]; and still another 
which had enjoined picketing of the plaintiffs' customers and suppliers in order to 
induce the plaintiffs who had theretofore hired no help at all to employ a member 
of the union [Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. Wohl, 61 Sup. Ct. 1108 (U. S. 1941) ]. For the most part, the lower 
courts have accepted the new doctrine gracefully. Cf. Culinary Workers & Bartenders 
Local 631 v. Busy Bee Cafe, 115 P. (2d) 246 (Ariz. 1941) (to secure collective 
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of all the members of the union by a single decree is understandable 
enough. For the object is, ex hypothesis one on which all the members 
are agreed; it is as improper for the individual member as it is for the 
whole group. More serious is the question when it is predicated on 
violence or some other similarly personal charge. In New York, for 
instance, it has been the rule of the Court of Appeals for some time 
that picketing should not be completely enjoined unless experience in 
the particular dispute has demonstrated that it cannot and will not be 
conducted peacefully.43 Presumably in a jurisdiction which takes this 
attitude it would be improper to enjoin picketing by all members of 
the union if only some of them were of the unpeaceful sort. This would 
clearly be so if we thought of the injunction as running against indi- 
viduals directly. Here it would be important to segregate the quiet, the 
peaceable and the polite from the noisy, the pugnacious and the vitriolic. 
No cause of action would be shown against the former and, on the 
assumption that even in a suit for an injunction the plaintiff must make 
out his case against those who are to be enjoined, no injunction which 
attempted to bind these should be granted. It ought to be no different 
if we change our verbal pattern and enjoin the union and, by this 
bargain from unorganized employer) ; Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 
753, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (Ill. 1941) (to get rid of "vendor" system of selling milk); 
2063 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 35 N. E. (2d) 373 (Ill. 1941) (to 
"unionize" the employer); Davis v. Yates, 32 N. E. (2d) 86 (Ind. 1941) (against 
"lessor-lessee" operation of mine in place of employer-employee operation) ; Blanford 
v. Press Publishing Co., 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941) (to "unionize" 
plaintiff's plant); East Lake Drug Co. v. Pharmacists & Drug Clerks' Union, Local 
1353, 298 N. W. 722 (Minn. 1941) (to secure a closed shop); Feller v. Local 144, 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 421, 19 A. (2d) 784 
(1941); Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union 313, 113 P. (2d) 28 (Wash. 1941) 
(to compel employer to abide by contract which itself required him to cancel contracts 
with others). Only a few have balked. Cf. Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 
v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (to induce owner of 
picketed premises to require third person with whom he had contract to deal with 
defendant union) ; Borden Co. v. Local 133, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (to induce plaintiff to discontinue sale of 
a supplier's products in order to unionize the supplier) ; Wisconsin Employment Rela- 
tions Bd. v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union, Local 225, 299 N. W. 31 (Wis. 1941) 
(to get a closed-shop contract without having the statutorily-required majority among 
the plaintiff's employees). 
43. J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Wise 
Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E. 749 (1935); May's Furs & Ready- 
to-Wear v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940); Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 
N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940) (all denying injunction against peaceful picket- 
ing). Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931); Steinkritz Amusement 
Co. v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 294, 178 N. E. 11 (1931); Busch Jewelry Co. v. United 
Retail Employees' Union, Local 830, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939) (all 
allowing injunction against peaceful picketing). 
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device, all who work on its behalf or, more familiarly, certain named 
defendants and their agents and associates. In either case the question 
is presumably one of preventing irreparable harm to the plaintiff. If this 
can be done by enjoining only those who engage in the wrongful con- 
duct, the plaintiff will have been given all that he can ask for. If he 
is given more, it is to the irreparable harm of the union members who 
are willing to stay within the letter of the law. We are not dealing 
here with a problem of liability in damages. Without prejudicing later 
discussion of this point, it ought to be fairly clear that the agency- 
liability question assumes a very different aspect in the suit for an in- 
junction. The case against the union in toto is not made out if the 
only relief that the plaintiff needs to protect his interests is restraint 
of the immediate offenders. Nor are we dealing here with the consti- 
tutional power of a court to impose what amounts to absolute liability 
under the circumstances - the problem that was before the Court in 
Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies."4 
Though we might wish that Mr. Justice Black's opinion had prevailed 
as to the constitutional issue, it is enough for present purposes to know 
that the position that he took is in accord with the equities of the case: 
I fully recognize that the union members guilty of violence 
were subject to punishment. . . . And some of them have in fact 
been prosecuted and convicted. . . . But it is going a long way to 
say that because of the acts of these few men, six thousand other 
members of the union can be denied the right to express their 
opinion to the extent accomplished by the sweeping injunction here 
sustained."45 
But this raises three closely related problems which it has not been 
important to discuss thus far: Is the class action available as a device 
for imposing individual liability? Are the members of a union a class 
within the meaning of the class suit rule? Who are the proper repre- 
sentatives of the members of the union when it is individual liability 
that the plaintiff seeks to impose? 
Some early cases answered the first of these questions in the negative. 
even in suits for injunction.46 If we still followed them there would, of 
course, be no need for discussing the other questions. American practice, 
however, has so generally accepted the class suit where equitable relief 
is asked that it is probably useless to discuss its propriety at large. 
But the discussion is not useless when the question is as to its avail- 
ability in a suit for damages. Nor, we may hope, is it futile (whether 
44. 312 U. S. 287 (1941). 
45. 312 U. S. 287, 316 (1941). 
46. Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 435 (C. A.); Geddes v. Australian 
Meat Industry Employees' Union, 17 New So. W. St. R. 119, 34 W. N. (N. S. W.) 
42 (Eq. 1917). 
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the relief asked for is equitable or legal) when the concern is with 
the conditions under which it may be used. 
That the class suit is, in any use of it to impose individual liability, 
a relaxation of the usual rule of our law that no person of sound mind 
and sufficient age shall be subjected to the liability that arises from a 
judgment against him without having been summoned and allowed to 
appear on his own behalf is not to be doubted. Whether or not it is 
an undue relaxation of that rule is a question the answer to which 
depends upon its use. Its defense against such a charge must rest not 
only on a plea of convenience, however great that may be, but on the 
assumption that those chosen to be representative defendants will be 
zealous to defend the interests of those whom they represent. This 
means that they must be real defendants defendants with a personal 
interest in the outcome of the suit and a knowledge which enables them 
to advise the counsel who conducts their defense." But the quantum of 
interest that is demanded goes even further, one may suppose. It goes 
to the point of requiring that they be in all respects subject to liability 
on the same grounds as those whom they represent, that the defenses 
open to them be in all respects the defenses which are open to those 
whom they represent, that, in short, the case against these other defend- 
ants be precisely what it is against them.48 
47. Compare Aalco Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Laundry Linen & Towel Chauffeurs 
Union, 115 S. W. (2d) 89, 91 (Mo. App. 1938): "The rule that a few of the members 
may represent the others does not rest on the concern, or supposed concern, that the 
few may have for the interests of the others, but rests on the concern they have for 
their own interests which are such that in protecting their own interests they protect 
the interests of the others." Compare the problem where it is one of group liability 
only- e.g., Biller v. Egan, 290 Ill. App. 219, 229, 8 N. E. (2d) 205, 209 (1937), 
where the representative defendant was a vice-president of an international union 
which was charged with interfering with a local's membership in the organization and 
the relief sought was an injunction against such interference: "The point made by 
appellant is that, since no action or threatened action on his part is alleged in the 
complaint, he cannot be presumed to represent the rights and interests of the persons 
whose action or threatened action is complained of. This contention overlooks the 
fact that appellant is made defendant 'as representative of the membership of said 
International Association.' If we are correct in our conclusion that he fairly repre- 
sents the rights and interests of the association, relief may be granted against the 
association even though no action or threatened action on the part of appellant is 
alleged in the complaint." 
48. Compare BATY, VICAlIous LIABILITY (1916) 54: "Representative actions were 
never meant to be used in order to enable plaintiffs to get cheap judgments by the 
gallon. They are only proper where, as in the Chancery practice from which they 
were copied, the position of the parties who are represented by one of their number 
is substantially identical. One of ten cousins of a testator, one of fifty creditors of 
a deceased, may fairly be allowed to represent his class. But nothing can be less 
proper than to conclude delicate questions of knowledge and intention on the part 
of members [of a trade union] . . . by an action brought against one of them of 
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Such in substance has been the suggestion in connection with the 
picketing problem. And such is the import of the remarks by Swinfen 
Ready, L. J., in Mercantile Marine Service Association v. ToMs49 where 
the suit was for damages for libel and the representative defendants 
selected by the plaintiffs were the officers and trustees of an association 
with a membership of 15,000 or more: 
"I have great difficulty in seeing that in this case there are 
numerous persons having the same interest in this cause or matter 
within the meaning of the rule. The action is for libel, and the 
plaintiffs must prove who published the libel, and prima facie only 
those who have published it either by themselves or by their ser- 
vants or agents or have authorized its publication are liable. The 
various members of this association may be in a wholly different 
position. If the members of the management committee were sued, 
and if in fact they had authorized the publication of the libel, they 
could raise such defenses as might be open to them. It might be 
that their defense would be that the words complained of were not 
capable of the meaning alleged or of any defamatory meaning, or 
that the words did not refer to the plaintiffs. The other members 
of the association, if sued, might say that, however defamatory the 
words complained of might be, they did not authorize their publi- 
cation; that they were on the high seas and knew nothing about 
the matter."50 
which the rest know nothing." Who shall be chosen as representative defendants 
is a question little discussed in the reports. But see Hill v. Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co., 
219 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Eagle Glass & 
Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U. S. 275 (1917); Local Union No. 1562, United Mine Workers 
v. Williams, 59 Can. Sup. Ct. 240, 258, 49 D. L. R. 578, 590 (1919) (per Anglin, J.); 
and the comments of Lord Macnaghten on Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 435 
(C. A.), in Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C. 426, 
439: "The persons there selected as representatives of the various unions intended to 
be sued were selected in defiance of all rule and principle. ... They represented 
nobody but themselves. Their names seem to have been taken at random for the 
purpose, I suppose, of spreading a general sense of insecurity among the unions who 
ought to have been sued, if sued at all, either in their registered name . . . or by their 
proper officers-the members of their executive committees and their trustees." Whether 
this last suggestion is correct is a matter discussed further in the text. See Cotter 
v. Osborne, 18 Manitoba 471, C. R. [1911] 1 A. C. 151 (C. A.), on the effect on 
represented class of representative defendants' disobedience of court's order to produce 
documents. 
49. [1916] 2 K. B. 243, 246 (C. A.). Apparently, in this case, the plaintiffs were 
trying to recover from the organization's funds. That the suit was disallowed under 
these circumstances of course indicates a great deal as to the English view of unin- 
corporated associations. But for our purpose its relevance is as stated in the text. 
50. Accord: Barker v. Allanson, [1937] 1 K. B. 463 (C. A.). Here the suit 
was for goods sold and delivered and the claim was that the debt "is due and owing 
to the plaintiff from the members of the said Lodge and is payable to the plaintiff out 
of the funds of the said Lodge." The court nevertheless refused to allow a repre- 
sentation order. See the remarks on the Tomn case, supra note 49. 
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The result of Swinfen Eady's reasoning is, one may suppose, that if 
there are any significant differences among the members of the described 
class there is no longer a class but two or more classes each of which 
must be appropriately represented. To put it otherwise, the question 
whether the members of a trade union constitute a class is a matter 
which cannot be settled by saying that they call themselves by a com- 
mon name. Rather is it a question which can be answered only by 
looking to the law of unincorporated associations applicable to the par- 
ticular case. Where it turns out that there is more than one class, each 
will have to be represented and the plaintiff will have to resort not 
only to the class action rules but to the rules governing joinder of parties 
if the suit is to be prosecuted all at once.5" 
Measured by standards such as these any attempt by statute to name 
a representative defendant and, at the same time, to impose individual 
liability on the union members in the event of an unsuccessful defense 
of the suit is likely to be highly defective. This may be said even if 
we grant, in the first instance, the propriety of using a class suit to im- 
pose such liability. For the statute furnishes no guarantee that the repre- 
sentative it chooses will be representative; it gives no assurance that 
there will not be an unwarranted commingling of classes to each of 
which different defenses may be available. Good as its choice of the 
president or treasurer may be when the question is one of corporate 
liability, the choice may be completely irrelevant when the problem is 
one of individual liability. Only on an assumption, contrary to the usual 
law of voluntary associations, that no more need be shown to establish 
a member's liability than that he was a member can such a statute be 
supported at all. The assumption becomes a result under the construc- 
tion of two Vermont statutes adopted in F. R. Patch Manufacturing Co. 
za. Capeless.52 Here was an imposition of unlimited liability on the mem- 
bers of the union without requiring that they be brought into court in 
the first instance and without giving them any opportunity subsequently 
to contest the correctness of the decision in the primary suit. Apart 
from any question of the wisdom or unwisdom of attempting to treat 
51. This is no guarantee, of course, that the prosecution will be equally successful 
against all the represented classes. In many instances it might very well not be. In the 
case under discussion the result would be an injunction against some of the union 
members and not against others. Our concern here is only with this sort of case. 
But in a jurisdiction which tests the liability of the group assets by the liability of 
the union members individually-compare the Toms and Barker cases, supra notes 
49 and 50-the result would presumably be no liability in the absence of an adjudica- 
tion against all the represented classes. In this country, as has already been indicated, 
the problem is handled for the most part as one of agency. The class suit-joinder 
of parties approach suggested in the text is adumbrated in Wood v. McCarthy, [1893] 
1 Q. B. 775. 
52. 79 Vt. 1, 63 Atl. 938 (1906). 
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a trade union as a partnership, we may still believe not only that it is 
unfair to do so without providing the safeguards which our usual part- 
nership procedure guarantees but also that the validity of so doing is 
doubtful under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 
Far more consonant with our usual notions of fair play is the procedure 
required by the New York law mentioned above which goes as far in 
the direction of safeguarding the member's interests as it fails to go 
in providing for group liability. For it seems quite clear that under this 
statute no judgment obtained in the earlier group suit will, ipso facto, 
be the basis of a recovery out of the individual members' pockets.54 
But the assumption which has been indulged up to this point that 
under the class suit rules an unlimited out-of-pocket liability can be 
imposed on the individual members of the union provided only that they 
have been adequately represented is itself of doubtful validity. The 
question was raised in the Massachusetts court in Maguire v. Reough55 
at almost the same time that the Pennsylvania court, deciding the Oster 
case, was suggesting the availability of this device as a means of reach- 
ing the common funds of the union. Like the Pennsylvania case the 
one in Massachusetts was to recover a death benefit. The two named 
defendants in it were alleged to be "co-partners in a voluntary associa- 
tion under the name and style of United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America." The further allegation was made that the 
action had "been brought against the defendants as representing all the 
individual members of said voluntary association."56 This turned out 
to be as unfortunate as the selection of the assumpsit action in the Oster 
case. The plain equitable remedy which the Pennsylvania court saw in 
that case was matched with the plain remedy at law seen by the Massa- 
chusetts court in this one: 
53. Compare Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (1919); Ratchford v. Covington 
County Stock Co., 172 Ala. 461, 55 So. 806 (1911) ; Woodfin v. Curry, 228 Ala. 436, 
153 So. 620 (1934); Webb & Martin v. Anderson-McGriff Hardware Co., 188 Ga. 291, 
3 S. E. (2d) 882 (1939). Even where the liability is limited to the unpaid portion of 
a subscription for stock, levy on a stockholder's property after return of execution 
against the corporation unsatisfied without giving the stockholder a prior opportunity 
to be heard "upon such questions as whether the judgment is void or voidable for want 
of jurisdiction or fraud, whether he is a stockholder and indebted, and other defenses 
personal to himself" is a denial of due process under the rule stated in Coe v. Armour 
Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 423 (1915). 
54. N. Y. GEN. Ass. LAW, ? 16, provides that the subsequent action against the 
members may be maintained "as if the first action had not been brought." 
55. 238 Mass. 98, 130 N. E. 270 (1921). 
56. Id. at 98. Why the plaintiff chose to sue in this form is not made clear from 
the report of the case. Perhaps it was done in order to avoid having to go outside 
the jurisdiction to reach the principal officers of the national union. Whatever the 
reason, labelling the union members "co-partners" was most unfortunate. 
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"The chief ground on which the plaintiff asks the court of equity 
to take jurisdiction of this contract case is the alleged inadequacy 
of the legal remedy, because at law all the members of the labor 
union must be made parties defendant. But the remedy she seeks 
is a legal one for judgment and execution against the association 
for the death benefit of $300. We have merely a large number of 
persons alleged to be liable as partners for a single debt. If the 
plaintiff desires to hold each of them liable, there is nothing in- 
equitable in requiring that each should have due notice and an 
opportunity to defend."57 
Maguire v. Reough, it may be admitted, is not unambiguous. Coming 
as it does from a jurisdiction where law and equity are still separate, 
it is not clear whether the court's objection is a formal one directed 
against an attempt to make an equity case out of a legal cause of action 
in order to get the advantages of equitable procedure or whether, quite 
apart from the equity-law aspect of the case, it is the far more substantial 
one that under the plaintiff's procedure individuals would be subjected 
to personal liability without having an opportunity to defend. If it is 
the former only, damages might still be recovered as incidental to equit- 
able relief where the cause of action is otherwise properly laid. If it is 
the latter, the rationale precludes resort to class suits to secure an out- 
of-pocket judgment even in code states and under the Federal Rules. 
Damages have been recovered in class suits incidentally to equitable 
relief in Massachusetts. But they have been recovered with a warning 
from the court that practice in this situation varies considerably from 
that used in the case of equitable relief pure and simple, that before a 
decree for damages can be entered against the class the members of 
the class must be identified, their names set out. "A decree against 
defendants generally who became parties only as members of a class 
and are not identified by a finding as to their names is ineffective," said 
the court. "Their identity is a matter for judicial determination and its 
lack cannot be supplied by a clerk of court in making the entry of an 
award of damages or in issuing an execution." 
This, of course, does not carry us very far if the identification need 
be made only by the representative defendants. Unless there is an oppor- 
tunity for each person immediately affected by the decree not only to 
contest the identification but also to show at least that he was inade- 
quately represented, in the sense in which that phrase has been used 
heretofore, the objection to imposing monetary liability on non-defending 
defendants, which the same court made in the earlier case, remains. 
Whether there is such an opportunity, at what stage of the procedure 
it shall come, and what questions may be raised, are then matters of 
57. 238 Mass. 98, 100, 130 N. E. 270, 271 (1921). 
58. Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 392, 191 N. E. 661, 668 (1934). 
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importance. The answer of the federal courts is that there is an oppor- 
tunity and that when it comes every issue that was before the court at 
the original trial may be contested.59 For, although the Federal Rules 
seem to invite plaintiffs to use the class suit against numerous defendants 
in the type of case we are considering, the invitation is not accompanied 
by a guarantee that a judgment secured under it will hold good. What 
effect such a judgment has is not treated by the Rules,6" but is left to 
59. For a recent case so holding, see Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U. S. 500 
(1938), where the suit was to enforce statutory double liability against the stockholders 
of a Federal Joint Stock Land Bank and the issue was whether a judgment of the 
bank's insolvency made in a prior class suit was res judicata against the present 
defendants who were not parties of record in the earlier suit: "There is nothing in 
the statute relating to the organization of Federal Land Banks and the imposition 
of the stockholders' liability to suggest that by virtue of their membership in the 
corporation the stockholders can be said to have subjected themselves to a procedure 
for determining in their absence the essential conditions of liability, or to have relin- 
quished their right to contest, as in any other litigation, every step essential to its 
establishment." The Court here deals with a case not discussed in the text, viz., that 
of limited out-of-pocket liability as opposed, on the one hand, to a liability limited to 
the union's assets and, on the other, to an unlimited out-of-pocket liability. Cf. Wood 
v. McCarthy, [1893] 1 Q. B. 775 (representation order allowed in suit for mandamus 
ordering union to make a levy of 6d. for his benefit on every member of his organ- 
ization). 
A discussion in Christopher v. Brusseiback (omitted from the above quotation) of 
cases in which limited out-of-pocket liability has been held allowable when the statute 
gives a proper beforehand warning "that the benefits of [corporate] membership carry 
with them the risk that the corporation may stand in judgment" for the stockholder 
is, of course, no basis for asserting that the same result would or ought to follow 
if the liability were unlimited. Quaere whether the latter is not the rule that should 
prevail for absent defendants in suits for injunctive relief -i.e., whether an absent 
defendant should not have an opportunity to contest the validity of the injunction 
in a contempt action. Surely it cannot be contended that, though of a different sort, 
the liability here is less than that in a suit for money damages. However wise it may 
be to refuse to open the injunction to collateral attack by an active defendant, there 
seems to be no good reason for refusing to do so in the case of the non-party to whom 
not even an appeal is open. Cf. Shaughnessey v. Jordan, 184 Ind. 499, 503, 111 N. E. 
622, 624 (1916): "No one of the members of the various unions, not served with 
process nor appearing in the court below, could have properly appealed from the 
judgment rendered, though each of them, or persons not members of any union, 
might have been punished for contempt for violating the court's order, and from the 
judgment for contempt, but no other, might have appealed." See also Lehman, J., 
dissenting, in Geller v. Flamount Realty Corp., 260 N. Y. 346, 352, 183 N. E. 520, 523 
(1932) on the suggested distinction in treatment of parties and non-parties; Ex parte 
Lyons, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190 (1938), [with which, however, compare 
Er parte Fortenbury, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 284, 101 P. (2d) 105 (1940)] and Local 13, 
Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P. (2d) 436 
(1940), in both of which review of an unconstitutional injunction against peaceful 
picketing was granted in habeas corpus proceedings after commitment for contempt. 
60. That a proposal to incorporate a section on the effect of a judgment under a 
class suit was made to the committee which drafted the Federal Rules and was 
rejected by them, see 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2283 (1938). 
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the substantive side of the law. And here, we are told, we encounter 
the doctrine of the "spurious" class suit" - a class action that is not 
rcs judicata for the represented members of the class, that can be 
contested by those members of the class who so wish even though they 
were otherwise properly represented. The result is that, on the pro- 
cedural side at least, there is, in the absence of a statute more elaborate 
than those governing class suits, no simple device for imposing un- 
limited liability on all of the members of the union at once. And such 
a result, it may be emphasized again, is fair enough. The procedural 
device adopted ought to be consistent with the liability imposed; if 
unlimited liability is to be the rule, then the procedure must be such 
as will bring home to each individual concerned the basis on which it 
is imposed, such as will ensure him an opportunity to defend on the 
merits and on the whole merits. 
'Were cases of this nature all that we had to rely upon there would 
still be justification enough for our saying that as a practical matter 
most members of unions are not liable in damages, that theirs is a 
limited liability. But the case is stronger than this. It is extremely 
doubtful whether the plaintiff in Magitire v. Reough could have re- 
covered even had she followed the court's suggestion and brought her 
suit in law. Here the teaching of the New York courts in contract cases 
that there must be explicit authority in the officers to pledge the personal 
credit of the members comes into play.2 Here, too, the holding of the 
English Court of Appeal in Barker v. AAllanson63 is appropriate. Here 
the explicit holding of the Missouri court that, unless it is the under- 
standing of the parties to a contract "that each member of the associa- 
tion is to be personally responsible for the entire loss," the liability is 
not a partnership liability is in point.64 
Nor is the case different in tort. We may put to one side those cases 
in which the members are active participants in the tort. Of course, 
there is no difficulty in holding them liable in such a case. Likewise, 
61. See 2 MOORE, Op. cit. sitpra note 60, at 2283 if. For a criticism of the doctrine 
of "spurious" class suits -in no wise affecting the conclusions reached in the present 
text, however -see Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit (1941) 8 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 684, 707. These writers are concerned chiefly with 
its usefulness where the class is plaintiff; see at 696n. for a useful discussion of the 
differences between this situation and one in which the class is defendant. 
62. See note 31 supra. 
63. See note 50 supra at 472 (per Greer, L. J.): "It is indisputable that only the 
persons who as members of the Lodge had authorized the order for meat and groceries 
given by the secretaries in 1921 could be made liable in an action for goods sold and 
delivered." 
64. O'Neal v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 216 Mo. App. 212, 222, 261 S. W. 
128, 131 (1924). Accord: Brady v. Mutual Benefit Dep't, Order of Ry. Conductors, 
215 Ky. 177, 284 S. W. 1045 (1926). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:57:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1941] TRADE UNION LIABILITY 61 
we may put to one side those cases in which the members, though not 
actual participants, are actively contributing to the accomplishment of 
the wrong through financial aid made with knowledge that it is being 
carried on. Lciwlor v. Loewe,65 we may believe, goes no further than 
this. The trial court's charge, under which the defendants were con- 
victed, is clear enough on the point: 
"Now if this evidence falls short of satisfying you that certain of 
these defendants did know of this unlawful conspiracy, or were in 
duty bound to know of it, or did tacitly approve of it, then such 
defendants should be acquitted... . Membership in a Labor Union 
and the payment of dues, are not acts of themselves that necessarily 
constitute counselling, advising, aiding or abetting. Membership and 
payment of dues are the life of the voluntary association, and are 
the foundation of all its authority and the source of financial assist- 
ance in executing that authority. 
"If these members paid their dues and continued to delegate 
authority to their officers and agents to commit unlawful deeds 
. . . under such circumstances as lead you to believe that they 
knew, or ought to have known, and that such officers and agents 
were, in that matter, warranted in the belief that they were acting 
within their delegated authority, then such members are jointly 
liable, and no others."66 
It was conviction under the latter part of this charge that the Supreme 
Court was called on to, and did, approve. The rule may be unwise, 
for if it were often applied it would be an encouragement to the 
union member to stay away from meetings and to remain ignorant of 
his organization's doings. It may be harsh, for it amounts to a get- 
out-or-be-liable rule so far as the informed member is concerned.67 But, 
65. 235 U. S. 522 (1915). 
66. Reprinted in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 209 Fed. 721, 727 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1913) where objection to the "ought to have known" phrase is met 
by saying: "If these words had been used alone, with no qualification or explanation, 
there might be some room for criticism, but when considered in connection with the 
rest of the charge, we are entirely satisfied that the jury could not have been misled. 
As previously pointed out, in cases of conspiracy it is sufficient if a state of facts be 
shown from which the jury are justified in drawing the conclusion that the defendants 
must have known of the existence of the conspiracy. It was in this sense that the 
judge used the words 'ought to have known.'" See also the comments of the court 
on the same problem in an earlier suit, Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 Fed. 522, 526, 528 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1911), cert. denied, 223 U. S. 729 (1912). 
67. Compare Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. 30, 40, 120 N. E. 188, 
191 (1918) (suit for injunction against aiding a strike, one of the objects of which 
was improper; 28 of the 250 member-defendants renounced the improper object; 
"It is plain . . . that they wanted to get out of the illegal strike . . . being main- 
tained by the union. . . . But they did not want to leave the union. To get out of 
the strike and to keep in the union they hit upon [and the trial court allowed] the 
novel scheme of renouncing the illegal purpose of the strike. But that was a futile 
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to the extent that it is a liability-imposing rule, it is still a rule cover- 
ing only continuing or deliberate torts. For the remainder, the casual 
wrong, the unrepeated harm, it is clear enough from the cases that the 
members of the union are not personally liable, that they enjoy the 
same immunity as do stockholders in a business corporation.68 And to 
the cases today may be added, as in the problem of union liability for 
the acts of its officers and members, the rule laid down in Section 6 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and its state counterparts.69 
The sum of the matter, then, is this: that it is the decided tendency 
of the cases in the United States today to make the trade union, on 
the substantive side of the law, as fully answerable as is any business 
corporation; that the procedural devices for imposing such liability are 
at hand; that, on the substantive side, it is the decided tendency of 
the cases to give the non-participating member the same limited liability, 
so far as money damages are concerned, as the stockholder; and that, 
procedurally, the non-participating member has an opportunity to show 
this immunity at any appropriate time. Ordinarily, then, the judgment 
of the trial court in Furniture Workers' Uiio i, Local 1007 v. United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters70 is the one that is to be expected in any 
successful suit against a trade union: "Upon their first cause of action, 
plaintiffs are entitled to judgment . . . in the sum of $3,954.42 . . . 
proceeding, being, as it was, nothing more than a statement of their motive in con- 
tinuing members of the union and so of necessity parties to the illegal strike. It had 
no effect upon their liability as parties to the strike and in the final decree no dis- 
tinction should have been made between the twenty-eight and the two hundred and 
twenty-two members of the two unions here in question.") Accord: Illinois Central 
R. R. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 190 Fed. 910 (C. C. E. D. Ill. 1911). But 
cf. Great Northern Ry. v. Great Falls Lodge, International Ass'n of Machinists, 283 
Fed. 557 (D. Mont. 1922). On the principal question in the Massachusetts case- 
that is, the legality of concerted action with two or more objects, one of which is 
improper -compare 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS ? 796. 
68. Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, 355, 161 N. E. 272, 275 (1928) ("The 
plaintiff's action is against all the members of the local union, many of whom were 
not present at the meeting at which the plaintiff was expelled, and who were not 
shown to have had knowledge of the various acts complained of or in any way to have 
participated in them. Mere membership in a voluntary association does not make all 
the members liable for acts of their associates done without their knowledge or 
approval . . ."); Quinton's Market v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 21 N. E. (2d) 546 
(1939) (wrongful picketing; good for contrast in treatment of injunction and damages 
issues) ; Hill v. Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co., 219 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U. S. 275 (1917); 
Local 1562, United Mine Workers v. Williams, 59 Can. Sup. Ct. 240, 253, 49 D. L. R. 
578, 587 (1919) per Anglin, J.; Cotter v. Osborne, 18 Manitoba 471, 481, C. R. [1911] 
1 A. C. 137, 146 (C. A. 1909). Semble contra: Clarkson v. Laiblan, 202 Mo. App. 
682, 216 S. W. 1029 (1919), with which, however, compare Clarkson v. Garvey, 179 
Mo. App. 9, 161 S. W. 664 (1913). 
69. See note 38 supra. 
70. 108 P. (2d) 651, 655 (Wash. 1940). 
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together with their costs and disbursements . . . against all of the 
members of Local 2097, so far only as it may be enforced against the 
property of Local 2097, which is the joint property of all of the mem- 
bers of Local 2097." The summary can itself be summarized by saying 
that, consciously or unconsciously, we have created an unincorporated 
corporation. The repercussions, if any, of the acceptance of such a 
doctrine on problems other than the immediate one of liability-on the 
right of the member to inspect the books of the union,7' for instance; 
on the doctrine, still accepted in a few jurisdictions, that a member may 
not sue his union for damages ;72 on the teaching that a union's property 
is its members' property and, therefore, that a distribution of beer, for 
instance, by the former to the latter is not a sale or gift within the 
meaning of a statute requiring a license so to distribute,73 or that an 
automobile is improperly registered unless it is registered in the name 
of all of the members of the union;71 on the diversity of citizenship 
required for federal jurisdiction ;75 on the applicability to the trade union 
of the contract, combination and conspiracy concepts of the Sherman 
Act; on the doctrine of corporate personality76 -are matters that the 
present discussion must leave unanswered. 
71. Compare Norey v. Keep, [1909] 1 Ch. 561; Dodd v. Amalgamated Marine 
Workers' Union, [1924] 1 Ch. 116 (C. A.). 
72. McClees v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 59 Ohio App. 477, 18 N. E. 
(2d) 812 (1938); Storms v. United Grain & Millworkers' Union, 64 Ohio App. 19, 
27 N. E. (2d) 781 (1940), appeal dismissed, 137 Ohio St. 267, 28 N. E. (2d) 561 
(1940); Kelly v. National Soc. of Operative Printers' Assistants, 84 L. J. K. B. 2236 
(C. A. 1915); Rex v. Cheshire County Court Judge, 90 L. J. K. B. 772 (C. A. 1921). 
73. People v. Budzan, 295 Mich. 547, 295 N. W. 259 (1940). 
74. Hanley v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 244 Mass. 284, 138 N. E. 323 (1923). 
75. It is the parties of record that are determinative of the court's jurisdiction in 
a class suit. See Moreschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613, 617 (W. D. Pa. 1939). 
Compare the requirement that it be shown that all members of the union have the 
proper citizenship when the suit is against the union in its own name. Ex parte Edel- 
stein, 30 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied sub nom. Edelstein v. Goddard, 
279 U. S. 851 (1929); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115, 117 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ("That an unincorporated labor union is suable as a legal entity 
implies nothing as to the citizenship of its members for purposes of federal jurisdic- 
tion"), aff'd, 289 U. S. 103 (1933) ; Rosendale v. Phillips, 87 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1937); International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. 
Supp. 178 (D. N. J. 1940); Green v. Gravatt, 34 F. Supp. 832 (W. D. Pa. 1940). On the 
domicile or residence of an unincorporated association for other purposes, compare 
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) ? 41, comment d; Brotherhood of R. R. 
Trainmen v. Cook, 221 S. W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), writ of error refused, 226 
S. W. xvi (1921). 
76. See generally COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) 143 et seq.; 
HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1930); Laski, The Personality of Associations 
(1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 404; Singleton, Entities and Real and Artificial Persons 
(1911) 12 J. OF COMP. LEG. 291; Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to 
Actions (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 383. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:57:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
